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The proposed paper will summarize the findings from my soon-to-be released book, Sustainable 
Prosperity in the New Economy?: Business Organization and High-tech Employment in the 
United States (Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2009), and draw out the implications 
for public policy and further research.  The book focuses on the characteristic features of the 
“New Economy Business Model” (NEBM) in the information and communications technology 
(ICT) industries. I contrast NEBM, with its vertical specialization and globalization of the value 
chain, venture capital and entrepreneurial startups, and the interfirm mobility of labor, with the 
“Old Economy Business Model” (OEBM), with its vertically integrated organizational 
structures, the growth of established companies, and career employment with one company.  
 
NEBM has definitively replaced OEBM as the dominant mode of business organization in the 
ICT industries of the United States. NEBM has been an important engine of innovation in the US 
economy. Yet over the past decade or so, NEBM has contributed to instability and inequity. The 
increased dominance of NEBM in the organization of the ICT industries has meant increasingly 
insecure employment and incomes for most workers in this sector, and it has become an 
important factor in the trend toward greater employment instability and income inequality in the 
US economy as a whole. 
 
Following the Internet boom and bust, what is particularly novel about the employment situation 
of the 2000s thus far has been the extent to which this insecurity has afflicted highly educated 
and experienced members of the US ICT labor force as their former employers prefer to hire 
younger high-tech workers in the United States. At the same time, companies are also offshoring 
to lower wage locations the types of high-skill jobs that Americans had thought could never be 
done abroad.  In terms of their education and qualifications, the US high-tech workers who suffer 
employment insecurity under NEBM are the types of people who in another era would have been 
the prototypical “organization men”.  
 
I show that the fundamental problem facing the US high-tech labor force in the 2000s is not, 
however, the globalization of high-tech employment but rather the fact that the US-based ICT 
companies that reap the profits of globalization have been using those profits to repurchase their 
own stock (often in addition to paying dividends) in attempts to boost their stock prices rather 
than increasing investments in R&D and creating higher value-added jobs for their experienced 
US employees.  I critique both the practice of stock buybacks and the ideology of maximizing 
shareholding value that legitimizes it (see my Financial Times comment of September 25, 2008 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e75440f6-8b0e-11dd-b634-0000779fd18c,dwp_uuid=11f94e6e-
7e94-11dd-b1af-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1). The critical area for strategic policy 
intervention—yet one that has been virtually absent from the U.S. policy debate in the 2000s—is 
corporate governance, by which I mean the institutions and mechanisms that determine and 
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regulate the ways in which business corporations allocate resources. More specifically, for the 
sake of stable and equitable economic growth, government policy must focus on the role of the 
stock market in the corporate allocation of resources. I argue that stock-price movements can be 
driven by innovation, speculation, and manipulation (including stock buybacks). The general 
objective of government policy in the area of stock-market regulation should be to eliminate the 
forces of speculation and manipulation in the determination of stock-price movements so that the 
stock market can function to support, and stock-price movements reflect, innovation.  
 
A prelude to such policy intervention is a rejection of the overwhelmingly dominant, but, as I 
show, fundamentally erroneous, ideology that maximizing shareholder value results in superior 
economic performance. With the transformation of employment relations, the globalization of 
the high-tech labor force, and the corporate commitment to maximizing shareholder value, well-
educated and highly experienced members of the US high-tech labor force face economic 
insecurity, even when US ICT corporations that could provide them with stable and remunerative 
employment opportunities are highly profitable. In terms of their accumulated capabilities, these 
ICT personnel should be among the best positioned in the U.S. labor force to find stable and 
remunerative employment.  
 
OEBM was hardly perfect, but it did provide employment security, health coverage, and 
retirement benefits to tens of millions of people whose work was at the heart of the economy. 
Under NEBM, the corporate economy no longer assumes these collective functions. In an era of 
open standards, rapid technological change, convergence of technologies, and intense global 
competition, business enterprises do need to be flexible in the deployment of capital and labor. 
One way of attaining this flexibility is by giving the organized labor force a major role in 
enterprise governance, as for example the Japanese, Germans, and Swedes have done, each in 
their own particular ways. In such a system, there is the possibility of an interaction between 
business and government to provide widespread economic security in employment and 
retirement while permitting business enterprises to remain innovative and competitive on a 
global scale.  
 
The other way is in the era of NEBM works under the pretense that the collective provision of 
economic security is not required. Just get enough education to be “employable” in a well-paid 
job, and individual initiative will provide one with the lifetime of security that one needs. From 
the NEBM perspective, the only legitimate function of the government is to invest in the 
knowledge base, and even then with no notion that, through taxation, a substantial proportion of 
the gains from innovative enterprise that this knowledge base makes possible should be returned 
to the government to support the ongoing development of innovative capabilities in the economy 
as a whole. My proposed paper for the Atlanta Conference on Science and Innovation Policy will 
critique this perspective, offer policy recommendations concerning the regulation of the financial 
sector and corporate financial behavior, and outline an agenda for further research on generating 
stable and remunerative high-tech employment opportunities in the United States. 
 
